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ABSTRACT
Regulated phenomena in changing environments are difficult to manage. 
Their complexity is many times higher that can usually be embraced in 
the conventional ways public administrations prepare draft statutes, 
adjudicate and control other people. The same or even more stands for 
inspections as public bodies that directly see “regulations in action”, how 
asymmetries between regulation and implementation arise. Inspection 
is in the context of executive tasks despite its age a relatively new and 
poorly understood element of regulatory policies. This paper claims 
that regulation and enforcement are two sides of the same coin: only 
“regulation-enforcement” (feed-in) and “enforcement-regulation” 
(feedback) are the “eyes and ears” of effective regulation. Without the 
latter, when rules are realistic and adequate for a given context, no 
amount of enforcement will make unrealistic rules work. At the same 
time, without the properly administrated enforcement steps, focused 
on the risk-analysis, risk-management (risk-based strategic planning), 
monitoring and sufficient resources, no amount of otherwise good 
regulation will provide expected results.
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Les	lois	inutiles	affaiblissent	les	lois	nécessaires. 
−	Montesquieu2
1 Introduction
At a time when public confidence in the functioning of public administration 
institutions becomes more and more fragile, when public confidence in the 
work of state institutions is very low (electoral participation included), each 
institution must rethink/contemplate its concept of action. This is all the 
1 This article is a revised version of the paper entitled ‘The Importance of Inspection for 
Achieving Public Goals’, presented at the EGPA Conference, Milano, 30 August-1 September, 
2017, co-authored with Polonca Kovač. The EGPA contributions are not publicly available.
2 The whole Montesquieu’s sentence is: ‘[a]s useless laws debilitate such as are necessary, so 
those that may be easily eluded, weaken the legislation. Every law ought to have its effect, 
and no one should be suffered to deviate from it by a particular exception’ (1989, p. 598)
Pečarič, M. (2017). The Effects of Law Through Actions of Inspections. International 
Public Administration Review, 15(3-4), 129–143
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truer for the supervisory, repressive institutions of the state among which 
are also inspection services. Inspection is in the context of executive tasks 
despite its age3 a relatively new and poorly understood element of regulatory 
policies; this can be inferred from the lack of literature and analysis on this 
topic (on the subject of inspections there is surprisingly little literature on 
their home field, i.e. administrative law, while e.g. also on Amazon.com or 
Google Books cannot be found not even one systematic work on this subject), 
although there are some, rare exceptions (Blanc, 2012; Jacobs & Cordova, 
2005; Monk, 2012; OECD, 2013, 2014; Palast, Oppenheim, & MacGregor, 
2003). Inspections are one of the basic administrative functions that control 
compliance with general rules. Qualitative, analytical, development-oriented 
and proactive inspection in the sense of understanding the authority, that 
is the highest when it is not even used (Arendt, 1972; Luhmann, 2013), it 
also has a wider task and objective; it must strive for preventive, advisory 
work, it must search for ways to connect performance with less burden on 
taxpayers. Among future challenges for countries will be the development 
and application of enforcement tools for the best possible outcomes with 
the highest compliance levels and minimum costs and burdens. Regulations 
as the formal tools of public power have been the subject of numerous 
debates (who can enact or change them, in what way, how, where and why, 
in what way they can be “good, better, smart, [really] responsive” etc.), but 
very seldom how they are de facto implemented, what enforcement tools 
are available, i.e. how information exchange takes place.4 This paper based 
on the latter sentence tries to point on circumstances which regulation 
should not disregard, and presents the inspection as an enforcement action 
in its wider context, because only a better understanding of the concepts 
of control (horizontal, between equal partners) and supervision (vertical, 
between unequal, vertically superior and/or subordinated members) can lead 
us to a better understanding of inspection’s work. In two parts there are four 
combinations, and the same could stand for regulation and implementation. 
A research question of this paper therefore is: 
3 The growth and rapid industrialization led to political demands for the increased regulation 
and control of the urgent capitalist order also in antebellum America, where inspections 
i.e. the Steamboat Inspection Act of 1837 worked before the first regulatory agency (the 
Interstate Commerce Commission) was established in 1887 (Schiller, 2016).
4 One effective example of information exchange presents the UK’s Regulatory Delivery as 
the part of Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, that ‘brings together 
policy expertise and practical experience to ensure that regulation is effectively delivered in 
ways that reduce burdens on business, save public money and properly protect citizens and 
communities’. (Regulatory Delivery, 2017) Among the interesting coordinate enforcement 
action tools is the regulators’ development needs analysis (RDNA) as a self-assessment tool 
with technical knowledge sections specific to areas of regulation, and Primary Authority that 
enables businesses to obtain from authorities consistent advice on compliance with regulation, 
in a tailored and cost effective manner. Primary Authority advice is assured – the primary 
authority may direct against enforcement action if it is deemed to be inconsistent with the 
advice given – and this gives businesses the confidence to invest and grow. PA represents a 
new way of regulating, in which regulators work closely with businesses to ensure compliance 
while encouraging growth. Since PA began in 2009, the scheme has been extended to include 
more areas of regulation and to enable more businesses to participate. Businesses which are 
regulated by multiple local authorities are able to partner directly with a primary authority or 
are able to access the scheme via a coordinator such as a trade association (Department for 
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017, p. 5).
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Can regulation and implementation as two faces of Janus’s coin be understood 
separately, or be regulated and implemented separately? 
An answer will be given with the help of literature review, the OECD and EU 
practice, the basic notions of regulatory cycle and systems management; the 
first will be presented also in picturesque mode because we a la Aristotle 
(2016) believe the soul never thinks without an image. Results could be helpful 
for regulators and inspections to work more separately or more closely. 
As an answer is almost intuitively given to a reader a problem is obviously 
somewhere else. It definitely has something to do with implementation, 
which is also the focus point of this paper.
2 Circumstances which Regulation Should not Disregard
One of the most quoted propositions in Spinoza’s Ethics is ‘the order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things and 
vice versa’ (Descartes, Spinoza, & Leibniz, 1974, p. 382). Thoughts and facts 
are indeed tightly connected; one without other can only be idealism or 
materialism. But how come this intuitive thought is so hard to apply in real 
occasions, in regulation? Countries e.g. many times enact, change or amend 
regulations a la Alice in Wonderland, who just wanted to go from one place 
“so long as I get somewhere”. This behaviour is spotted when regulators 
do not connect ideas with facts and vice versa, when they are always on the 
move and always regulate something, but they basically do not know what 
they (will) cause, despite of the even knowable, legally determined goals. The 
basic frame in which goals are achieved in democratic countries is the division 
of power between the legislative and executive branch; this (common-sense) 
division also divides proclaimed goals and their factual achievement. Already 
for Goodnow administration was the function of executing the will of the 
state or the expression of the political will (Goodnow, 1900, 1905), formally in 
general rules determined in the notion of public interest. Although he made the 
difference between the expression (politics) and execution (administration) 
of the state will, he also knew ‘the administrative system may, however, be so 
arranged as to make the actual practice quite contrary to the theory’ (1900, 
p. 29). Duguit as one of the most vivid promoters of the country as public 
service, claimed ‘a legal system is real only in the degree in which it creates 
rules satisfying the needs of men in a given society at a definite moment of 
time’ (1921, p. 25). Despite this intuitive and rational division between the 
interests and the objective possibilities of their achievement (between theory 
and practice), and despite intuitive knowledge that goals can be effectively 
achieved only through the good implementation of (regulatory) goals, only 
regulation − as only one of the country’s ius imperii instruments − has been 
mostly emphasised on the expense of rules’ implementation.
Sometimes new terms/institutions are developed solely to embrace the 
non-effective practices (this can be confirmed from their names, e.g. good 
International Public Administration Review, Vol. 15, No. 3-4/2017132
Mirko Pečarič
administration, good governance, responsive, better, smart regulation), 
although the basic ideas stay the same: “if you want to accomplish your goals, 
you must have appropriate tools to do so”, and “if you want to determine 
your goals, you must have appropriate facts established with proper tools”. 
This obviously right and intuitive idea could be wrong, because it fits into 
Newton’s second law of motion,5 as a classic example of a one-way cause-
effect thinking. It disregards the mental, internal processes of living 
organisms, which are able to control aspects of their external environments. 
Cziko describes this as circular causality in which causes are also effects and 
the latter are also causes: ‘perceptions do not control behaviour. Rather, 
individuals vary their behaviour as necessary to control their perceptions and 
thereby obtain desired outcomes and avoid unwanted ones’ (2000, p. 253). 
If one-way cause-effect relation was a long time the main prerogative, the 
theory of complex adaptive systems gives a fresh insight into living systems 
with a concept of emergence: ‘[a]n emergent property is a global behaviour or 
structure which appears through interactions of a collection of elements, with 
no global controller responsible for the behaviour or organization of these 
elements. The idea of emergence is that it is not reducible to the properties 
of the elements’ (Feltz, Crommelinck, & Goujon, 2006, p. 241). All is not only 
more than the sum of its parts, but what is or could be “all” cannot be known 
in advance; it emerges only through interaction. A very similar concept is the 
concept of synergy that means ‘behaviour of whole systems unpredicted by 
the behaviour of their parts taken separately’ (Fuller & Applewhite, 1997, p. 
59).6
Although in regulation emphasis is put on goals and tools by which the former 
can be achieved, their relations are mostly forgotten: not only tools are chosen 
to achieve goals, but also the first constantly and in a new way co-define the 
second during their usage. What will “(re)emerge” from some regulations 
therefore crucially depends on the interaction of all (legal, factual, personal, 
organisational, financial, etc.) parts. A further characteristic of this emergent 
property is its ‘complex behaviour [that emerges] from simple rules. Those 
rules imply general regularities, but the working out of an individual case 
exhibits special regularities in addition’ (Gell-Mann, 2002, p. 313). How this 
could be relevant for regulation? The “emergent idea of regulation” is that if 
you want goals, focus on a system in which goals are achieved, i.e. focus on 
processes, their interactions, build the real-time feedback loops and establish 
transparency for all stakeholders and citizens. Despite all efforts, final goals 
can be more (known today − in the absence of the mentioned emergent idea 
of regulation − as unintended consequences) or less (our goal) different. On a 
5 The acceleration of an object as produced by a net force is directly proportional to the 
magnitude of the net force, in the same direction as the net force, and inversely proportional 
to the mass of the object (Newton, 1947).
6 Emergence and synergy could not only explain why ‘rational, self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interests’ (Olson, 2002, p. 2), or the fact that ‘even 
if each individual of firm were rational, that would not ensure systemic stability’ (Stiglitz, 2009, 
p. 17). 
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general (regulatory) level a system is needed in which information asymmetries 
are minimised in a quick manner (this include also the moral hazard and human 
fallibility).
Breyer − as one of the first “ice-breakers” of the field of regulation − in 1982 
claimed regulation cannot be described only in legal terms: ‘to generalize 
usefully about regulation, one must understand the substance of the 
regulatory program’ (S. Breyer, 1982, p. vii). He presented in Regulation and 
Its Reform a system of categorising regulation. Although he suggested case-
by-case approach to regulatory reform, i.e. detailed examination of individual 
agencies (with sunset proposals and agency-by-agency review), and devoted 
to that area some (only three) pages (S. Breyer, 1982, pp. 365–368) it was 
not enough (not even in 20067) to start the story of regulation de facto on 
both (determination and implementation) sides. Ex post evaluation is ‘vital 
to the successful implementation of…legislation’ (Gunningham, 2012, p. 
120); there is much literature about the responsive (Ayres & Braithwaite, 
1995), smart (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998), meta (Chiu, 2015) or 
risk-based regulation (Black, 2012), but there are rare works focused on the 
implementation level: Baldwin, Cave and Lodge propose to regulators a broad 
regulatory process with five core tasks (the DREAM framework): detecting, 
responding, enforcing, assessing and modifying (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 
2013, p. 227), while for Black regulators should practice really responsive 
regulation,8 but a common denominator of most is the regulator, not the 
implementer. In documents ex post evaluation is mentioned already in the 
origins of regulatory impact assessment9, but it was rarely de facto executed. 
For almost three decades, ex ante regulatory impact assessment was the 
“regulatory star”. The UK Better Regulation Task Force in 2003 among the 
five principles of good regulation included proportionality, accountability, 
consistency, transparency and targeting. Although only the latter (regulation 
should be focused on the problem, and minimise side effects) fulfils some 
parts of our emergent idea of regulation (enforcers should focus primarily 
on those whose activities give rise to the most serious risks, and regulations 
should be systematically reviewed to test whether they are still necessary and 
effective), it disregards that targeting depends crucially on data which have 
mostly implementers (street-level bureaucracy), not regulators. The OECD 
in 2006 noted ‘there is, as yet, little evidence of the systematic adoption of 
7 Breyer with co-authors in 2006 issued a large work on administrative law, but on the subject 
of regulation the typical justifications for regulation and the classic regulatory tools are very 
briefly mentioned (S. G. Breyer, Stewart, Sunstein, & Vermeule, 2006, pp. 4–13).
8 To be “really responsive” regulators have to respond not merely to firms’ compliance 
responses, but also to their behaviour, attitudinal settings, to the broader institutional setting 
of the regulatory regime; to the different logics of regulatory tools and strategies; to the 
regime’s own performance; and finally, to changes in each of these elements (Baldwin & 
Black, 2007, p. 17). 
9 In one of the first OECD’s documents on the subject of regulation, the OECD Report on 
Regulatory Reform (1997) ex post evaluation (review regulations systematically to ensure 
that they continue to meet their intended objectives efficiently and effectively and ensure 
that regulations and regulatory processes are transparent, non-discriminatory and efficiently 
applied), was also mentioned, but on the national levels this was not enough for its serious 
application.
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ex post assessments of the ex ante predictions about probable regulatory 
impacts made in RIA documents – that is, of “outcome testing”’ (OECD, 2006, 
p. 33), but in 2009 it already found a number of authorities using RIA methods 
to strengthen their evidence-based policy making in the area of corporate 
governance. It suggested that also in areas where ‘a need to act quickly 
[exists]…best practice indicates that there should at least be an ex post 
analysis to determine whether the emergency or hastily introduced measures 
were indeed effective and efficient’ (OECD, 2009, pp. 178–179).10 Despite 
efforts, ‘the processes of how regulations are designed and developed, how 
to improve them and make them “smarter”, have been given considerably 
more study than the regulatory delivery mechanisms of inspections and other 
enforcement tools’ (OECD, 2013, p. 4). Improving the design of regulation 
through regulatory impact analysis, stakeholder engagement and the 
removal of unnecessary burdens has prevailed ‘over regulatory enforcement 
in most OECD countries so far. Scarce attention has been paid to examining 
possibilities for improving the way regulations are implemented and enforced’ 
(OECD, 2014, p. 3).11 Although countries gave in recent year a large attention 
to administrative burden reduction, the latter unfortunately does not (also 
due to data incompatibility) incorporate data which inspections has:
Though in theory it should be possible to use data from inspectorates themselves 
to estimate the burden [reduction] and its evolution, in practical terms this is 
usually impossible. Inspectorates tend to be reluctant to share this data but, even 
when they do, its structure is often inadequate to this purpose (difficult in most 
countries to calculate really how many different businesses were inspected, as 
distinct from how many visits took place), and its contents not detailed enough 
(e.g. on duration of visits) (Blanc, 2012, p. 49).
The OECD’s international standard cost model (SCM) that is also used in 
the EU and its member states does not include enforcement or inspection 
costs (European Commission, 2007; SCM network, 2016).12 In December 
2012, the European Commission upgraded its efforts in the field of Smart 
Regulation by launching the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 
(European Commission, 2014), aimed at eliminating unnecessary regulatory 
burdens and ensuring that the body of EU legislation remains fit for purpose. 
10 A connection between efficiency and effectiveness can be vividly expressed in Ackoff’s (1978) 
relation between doing the “right thing wrong” (effective inefficiency) or the “wrong thing 
right” (ineffective efficiency). The more efficient people/administrators are at the doing the 
wrong (ineffective) thing, the wronger they become.
11 Based on this observation the OECD (2014) developed the eleven principles addressing the 
design of the policies, institutions and tools for promoting effective compliance and the 
process of reforming inspection services to achieve results. The way inspections are planned, 
their better targeting, communication with regulated subjects, preventing corruption and 
ethical behaviour could be based on ‘1. Evidence-based enforcement; 2. Selectivity; 3. Risk 
focus and proportionality; 4. Responsive regulation; 5. Long-term vision; 6. Co-ordination 
and consolidation; 7. Transparent governance; 8. Information integration; 9. Clear and fair 
process; 10. Compliance promotion; and 11. Professionalism.
12 The SCM uses a formula to measure the administrative burdens (Cost per administrative 
activity [or per data requirement] = Price x Time x Quantity [population x frequency]). 
Administrative costs as defined by the SCM are only incurred where the inspection relates 
entirely to an information obligation. Inspections with a broader focus are not included (SCM 
network, 2016, p. 41).
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Among horizontal actions the Commission enumerated beside the impact 
assessment, stakeholder consultation, measurement of regulatory costs and 
benefits and reporting requirements, also ex-post evaluation (as a clear sign 
that ex post evaluation is usually not taken into account in impact assessment) 
that verifies whether the expected results and impacts of EU regulation 
have been achieved (inspections are not mentioned). The High Level Group 
on Administrative Burdens (HLG) that was set up in 2007 to advise the 
Commission on the implementation of the Action Programme for Reducing 
Administrative Burdens in the European Union among five recommendations 
recommends ‘that the Commission develops a common EU methodology 
to measure regulatory costs and benefits, makes the evaluation of all EU 
legislation compulsory on the basis of this common methodology to measure 
actual outcomes against original objectives before any proposal for revision 
or new legislation is made’ (The High Level Group on Administrative Burdens, 
2014, p. 53).
On the EU level, a serious step towards ex post evaluation was made with the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) that replaced in 2015 the Impact Assessment 
Board (IAB) of 2006.13 The IAB enforced quality standards for the impact 
assessments for Commission proposals, but the Juncker Commission14 
wanted to achieve more in better regulation. It established the RSB in 2015 
with reinforced independence and enhanced responsibilities to cover “fitness 
checks” and significant ex post evaluations of existing policies. The goal 
is to ensure that evaluations supporting Commission policy-making are of 
high quality. This helps make operational what is commonly referred to as 
the “evaluate first” principle. The RSB explained how the “evaluation first” 
principle works in practice:
The RSB looks only at fitness checks and the most important evaluations; the 
selection of the planned evaluations is based on the Commission’s multi-annual 
evaluation planning. Evaluated services are obliged to write a Staff Working 
Document (SWD) that summarises the evaluation and its conclusions. The 
Board’s opinion on evaluations focuses on the quality of the SWD. The few 
(seven) SWDs that the Board reviewed over the past year had limited critical 
analysis of such issues as coherence, relevance and EU value added. They also 
did not systematically draw clear conclusions for follow-up action and did not 
always exploit all the information that external evaluators had collected. By 
contrast, the analysis of efficiency and effectiveness was more complete. All 
evaluations should constitute an essential input to the corresponding impact 
assessment. The RSB sees evaluations together with the impact assessment 
and can include its assessment of their quality in the opinion it provides on 
the impact assessment. In the course of 2016, has seen and reviewed another 
13 The European Commission already in 2010 stated that ‘the Commission will target the whole 
policy cycle by attaching more importance to the evaluation of existing legislation and policies. 
The resulting evidence will be put at the heart of the design of new or revised regulation, 
alongside with impact assessments’. IP/10/1296, 8 October 2010. http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-10-1296_en.htm?locale=en
14 Decision of the President of the European Commission on the Establishment of an Independent 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board, Strasbourg, 19.5.2015 C(2015) 3263 final.
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15 evaluations in this way. Overall, it appears that at least half of the impact 
assessments applied the “evaluation first” principle in 2016. The “evaluation 
first” principle increases transparency. Board review of the SWDs also provides 
an institutional safeguard against “cherry-picking”, i.e. selectively reporting 
evidence that supports a particular approach. The presence of such a safeguard 
serves to increase the credibility of evaluation practices (Regulatory Scrutiny 
Board, 2016, p. 17).
The RSB’s focus on evaluations done by services which implement regulations 
is very relevant (implementers have the largest amount of information that 
emerges at the very time of rule implementation), but on a long run, the 
“evaluation first” principle should become a part of the regulatory culture of 
each institution per se.
3 An Inspection as an Enforcement Action
Regulation and enforcement are two sides of the same coin; as for every 
two parts, also here we have four combinations: “regulation-regulation” is 
blind and ineffective, “enforcement-enforcement” (without rules) is deaf 
and illegal, while “regulation-enforcement” (feed-in) and “enforcement-
regulation” (feedback) are the “eyes and ears” of effective regulation. 
Without effective regulation, when rules are realistic and adequate for a 
given context, no amount of enforcement will make unrealistic rules work. 
At the same time, without the properly administrated enforcement steps, 
focused on the risk-analysis, risk-management (risk-based strategic planning), 
monitoring and sufficient resources, no amount of otherwise good regulation 
will provide expected results. The effective and efficient regulation is 
constantly in regulators’ focuses, but both terms are also tightly connected 
with enforcement.15 In recent years grows a recognition that also ensuring 
effective compliance with rules and regulations is the important factor in 
creating a well-functioning society and trust in government (OECD, 2013, 
2014). Enforcement represents the classic types of rules’ implementation 
(advice, warning, sanction) conducted by regulatory agencies and law-
enforcement bodies (penalty, prosecution), as well as the other legal or even 
potential actions of agencies (proposals for legal changes, public notices, 
naming and shaming), of third parties (actio popularis, qui	 tam) or even of 
undefined populations (loss of confidence, demonstrations, media). Among 
enforcement tools that stand up front by the number of legal procedures, 
employees, competencies for a forced execution or repression with grave 
consequences for persons subjected to legal obligations, are inspections as 
‘any type of visit or check conducted by authorised officials on products or 
business premises, activities, documents etc.’ (OECD, 2013, p. 3).
15 Due to the mentioned notions of emergence and synergy, enforcement could be even more 
important than regulation, because new emergent properties can be spotted only in this 
stage of regulatory cycle.
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The operation of inspections is provided by public funds, so the public rightly 
expects funds are used in the rational and efficient manner. All this is true, but 
it is already a result which is determined by their approach. An activity of public 
institutions should be transparent, efficient and responsive to the public 
needs. This is even more true for the controlling and/or repressive institutions 
of the country. Despite the increasing focus or even quite continuous efforts 
to eliminate administrative burdens, the field of inspections continues to be 
the field with low-interest for it. There are numerous talks about the better 
transparency, efficiency, responsiveness and other unspecified concepts, but 
very seldom what they mean in practice and/or how they are put into practice. 
In connection with the achievement of public objectives, the public attention 
has been so far largely devoted to the “art of regulation”, while techniques, 
i.e. the enforcement tools of the very same regulation, has remained 
somehow by the side. There is ample evidence that inspections are crucial 
for the determination how regulations are viewed from businesses and the 
economy. Based on the analysis of 25 respondent states about inspections 
Monk concludes that despite ‘much good practice taking place there is still a 
high level of complexity, considerable inconsistency and a general gap in the 
way inspection authorities are governed and their performance of inspections 
implemented and assessed’ (Monk, 2012, p. 4).To Blanc
inspections and enforcement actions are generally the primary way through which 
businesses, “experience” regulations, and regulators; inadequate approaches 
in enforcement and inspections can mean that changes in regulations fail to 
deliver their full benefits, evolutions in inspections and regulatory delivery to 
make them more compliance-focused, more supportive and risk-based can all 
lead to real and significant improvements for economic actors, enforcement and 
inspections are as much about methods and culture as institutions, and as much 
about organizational mechanisms as legislation (Blanc, 2012, p. 7).
Each inspection should conduct its work by checking not only the compliance 
of operations with regulations but also the public opinion (also through 
application forms, anonymous tips, affairs) vis-à-vis individual activities (how 
they are performed, what kind of relationship is to and between the parties, 
etc.), what kind of attitude of a subject inspected has towards inspections and 
thereby (as well as by asking questions) analyse − based on the data and views 
of all participants − a situation of individual activities, present proposals for 
legislative changes and the like. Control through inspections should not be 
implemented just as simply control about an implementation of laws (which 
leads to technicism and bureaucratisation of those services), but it should 
monitor the application of the law particularly to protect the public interest 
in connection with the rights of individuals. The principles of proportionality, 
independence, and professionalism of the inspection should occur therefore 
at the very beginning, in the forefront of their work. Inspections are used on 
areas where a penalty for infringement is not fully automatic (where it can 
be determined directly from records, reports, etc.), and/or where a specific 
knowledge to detect violations is needed. Thus, in addition to the classic 
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legal bases understanding is needed about ways of practical implementation 
of regulation, how the interaction between the inspection and taxpayers is 
developed, how practices can be harmonised, and results measured and finally 
how a relevant field can be directed towards the desired goal. Notwithstanding 
that a system of external control must be present, there should be also 
established an internal system of control that not only monitors but also 
manages. This duality can be sometimes or somewhat overlooked, but it was 
always known; French know it in the adage: juger l’administration, c’est encore 
une fois administer. As soon as a certain activity is regulated under the law, 
its implementation must be such that rules are not violated. A guarantee for 
this is primarily a public body/person that/who implements activities, and not 
a higher supervisory authority – even if the latter has a controlling function 
determined as one of its main tasks (inspection, a court of audit). A duty to 
control is never solely a function of control, but through it, an appropriate 
dose of control activities is also administrated.
Control processes are the generator of the executive, repressive apparatus; 
it is essential the methods, scope and resources are in the work of scheduled 
inspections, coordinated and controlled, and especially in a constant contact 
with the area where they are implemented. In the time of growing intertwining 
of fields, the complexity of the work, development of technologies etc., it is 
important the tactic of inspection is not just a matter of an individual inspection 
or even multiple inspections, but of all stakeholders, which may be affected by 
the work of the first. The inspection is only one element of control; the original 
inspection should be carried out already within a scope of individual activities. 
In addition to the repressive, the inspections can - by itself or in combination 
with repressive measures - also use educational approaches to provide a 
voluntary operation, which should be in accordance with regulations, i.e. when 
inspector “speaks softly, but with a long stick in his hand”. The inspector is not 
only an officer, a scientist, and an artist but the combination of everything. 
We can get to the very core of inspections, not through a study of individual 
laws, but we need to know their practices. The mentioned arguments about 
the wider significance of (systematic) management can be carried out also 
by inspections along with their traditional repressive powers. This lead us 
towards a clear understanding of regulatory circle and the extraction of 
management criteria in the field of inspection. As regulation and enforcement 
are two sides of the same coin, their basic elements are a mirrored picture of 
both sides. Both sides are established and implemented in a given country’s 
context, i.e. in its world-view (ger. weltanschauung) and different interest from 
its environment that affect their content:
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Figure 1. Regulation and Enforcement Cycle (own construction)
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The implementation of control depends on the types of implementation, 
while the latter are not only associated with the problem of the recruitment of 
suitable staff but also how public employees understand the environment in 
which they work, their personal characters or world views. A system of control 
also depends on the education, training and competence of supervisors, but 
before all these and other possible fields should be considered, there must be 
consideration of the ways of control, their types and methods, as these have a 
significant impact on final results. The research question from the introduction 
of this paper is answered negatively: regulation and implementation cannot 
be understood separately, nor cannot be regulated and implemented 
separately. Regulators and inspections should therefore work closer, but 
the problem is not a system per se, but people (officials, politicians) who do 
not (want to) understand that complex adaptive systems always develop in 
their own ways (they find their own equilibrium, they are self-adaptive) if not 
administrated by the people.
4 Conclusion
Because of the ex ante impossibility of knowable (emergent) effects, it is of 
crucial importance that all elements are detected as soon as possible. Only 
through the non-stop feedbacks, (re)organisations and (re)arrangements 
of elements, control can be constantly (re)acquired over new situations 
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that emerge during a change of different conditions or appear during 
an implementation of rules. The biggest challenge for countries is the 
formulation and application of strategies for the implementation of legal 
rules to ensure the best results with the highest possible level of compliance. 
The formulation-application-implementation trinity should be done while 
keeping regulatory costs and administrative burdens as low as possible. The 
activities of public institutions should be transparent, efficient and responsive 
to the needs in their areas. All this may be true, but it already represents a 
result that is conditioned by an appropriate way of getting things done. Each 
institution should conduct its work not only in compliance with the rules; 
activities should be done parallel with public opinion that the public has vis-a-
vis various activities, including with the public body’s self-evaluation.
Control should not be carried out as a mere control of the application of the 
law, but for the protection of the public interest and public gains concerning 
the rights of individuals. Only a detailed understanding of the concepts of 
control, supervision, and inspection can lead us to a better understanding of 
inspection’s work, which should not be based solely on the repressive “command 
and control” (where power flows only one way in the form of instructions and 
commands,) but also on routing-benefits of adaptation, provided by a two-way 
communication. Information is acquired also by persons outside inspections, by 
the taxpayers, competitors, consumers and citizens; it can be obtained through 
implementing powers in the field (ex post after the occurrence of an accident, 
by corrective measures or ex ante in relation to the complaints, anonymous tips, 
from other national authorities and planned inspections), with a request to 
present documents from persons liable to act according with rules, or through 
a commitment to have records about an inspected activity. A function of 
control so therefore never only the function of control, but through it (with the 
“appropriate dose of control”) also a relevant field is managed. Future research 
on this field could focus in systemic preparation of inspections’ reports with 
the separate fields for communication with stakeholders and the public, for the 
control, preventive and repressive actions, risk assessment/management, and 
the last, but not least, for citizen participation and other democratic elements. 
We should not forget the best repressive institution is the one that never/very 
rarely uses its legal power to coerce its fellow-citizens. In Slovenia, e.g. decision-
makers could begin with a new version of Inspection Council’s draft report for 
future reports; it could be more valuable than to amend Inspection Act…
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POVZETEK
1.01	Izvirni	znanstveni	članek
Učinki predpisov zaradi dejavnosti inšpekcij
Regulirane dejavnosti je v spreminjajočih se okoljih težko upravljati. Njihova 
kompleksnost je navadno višja, kot se jo običajno razume v okviru javnih uprav, ki 
v večini primerov pripravljajo osnutke zakonov, odločajo v upravnih postopkih 
in izvajajo nadzor nad ljudmi in njihovimi dejavnostmi. Vse to, enako ali celo v 
večji meri velja za inšpekcije kot javne organe, ki neposredno vidijo “predpise 
v akciji” in ki so neposredne priče pojavu asimetrij med predpisi in njihovim 
izvajanjem. Inšpekcija je v kontekstu izvršilnih nalog kljub svoji starosti relativno 
nov in slabo razumljen element regulativnih politik. Članek temelji na ideji, 
da sta regulacija in njeno izvrševanje dve strani istega kovanca: le “regulacija-
izvrševanje (vložki)” in “izvrševanje-regulacija” (povratne informacije) so “oči 
in ušesa” učinkovite regulacije. Brez slednje, ko so pravila realna in ustrezna 
za določen kontekst, nobena mera izvrševanja ne bo mogla sicer spremeniti 
nerealnih pravil v uspešna pravila. Istočasno pa brez usmerjenega izvrševanja 
v pravilnem zaporedju, ki je osredotočeno na analizo tveganj, obvladovanje 
tveganj (strateško načrtovanje na podlagi tveganj), spremljanja in zadostnih 
sredstev, nobena količina sicer dobro zasnovane regulacije ne bo prineslo 
pričakovanih rezultatov. Samo natančno razumevanje pojmov kontrole, 
nadzora in inšpekcije, lahko vodi k boljšemu razumevanju dela inšpekcijskega 
dela, ki ne sme temeljiti zgolj na represivnemu “ukazu in kontroli” (kjer moč 
teče enosmerno v obliki ukazov in navodil), ampak tudi na način prilagajanja, 
ki ga zagotavlja dvosmerna komunikacija. Funkcija nadzora torej ni nikoli 
le funkcija nadzora, temveč se prek njega (z “ustreznim odmerkom”) tudi 
upravlja relevantno področje. Prihodnje raziskave na področju inšpekcij bi se 
lahko osredotočile na sistemsko pripravo poročil o inšpekcijskih pregledih 
z ločenimi odseki za poročanje o komuniciranju z zainteresiranimi deležniki 
in javnostjo, o nadzornih, preventivnih in represivnih ukrepih, za oceno/
upravljanje s tveganji in ne nazadnje, ali predvsem za sodelovanje ljudstva pri 
upravljanju javnih zadev in na druge demokratične elemente. Ne gre pozabiti, 
da je najboljša represivna institucija tista, ki ob doseganju ciljev nikoli ali zelo 
redko uporablja legalno represijo moč za namen prisile lastnih sodržavljanov.
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